Four Levels of Politics
Four Levels of Politics
a partial reply to Matt Bruenig
Over a decade ago, Matt Bruenig published an article outlining the 3 basic levels on which he thinks about politics. The three levels in question, according to Bruenig, are:
The abstract normative level- ie, one’s intrinsic moral values.
The ideal institutions level- ie, the institutions which best cohere with one’s values, at least of all of the sets of institutions whose success one can “envision”.
The pragmatic level- ie, the institutions and policies which we should be trying to put in place given the fact that our ideal institutions are currently out of reach.
Bruenig then goes on to briefly articulate his views with respect to each of these levels. On the abstract normative level, he accepts capability egalitarianism conjoined with a Rawlsian difference principle. On the ideal institutions level, he is a market socialist. Bruenig doesn’t say much about what his views are regarding the third level, but has spent no shortage of time articulating and defending immediate term policy proposals elsewhere.
This basic framework for thinking about one’s political worldview is, I think, helpful and illuminating. In this article, I will not be aiming to challenge Matt’s analysis- indeed, for all I know, Matt will take no issue with anything that I go on to say here. Rather, I will merely offer some modest thoughts that I think serve to add further refinement to the model which Matt has advanced. I will also, like Matt, briefly articulate my own views with respect to each of the layers of political thought which I take to merit attention.
As we have seen, Matt uses the term “ideal institutions” to refer to those institutions which best cohere with his values, at least of all of the sets of institutions whose functioning he can envision. It follows that there are potentially sets of institutions which cohere even better with Matt’s values than his “ideal institutions”, but whose existence or viability is presently out of his epistemic reach. Perhaps, then, what Bruenig calls “ideal institutions” would more aptly be called “provisionally ideal institutions”, with his actual ideal institutions being more undefined. Indeed, in his popular book why not socialism, the great socialist philosopher G.A. Cohen articulates just such a distinction.
Cohen argues that capitalism is intrinsically morally objectionable on the grounds that it undermines both justice and community. Importantly, many of Cohen’s critiques apply not only to the ownership structure of capitalist businesses, but to the market scheme according to which goods are allocated in a capitalist society. Cohen, however, being the careful thinker that he is, does not thereby immediately conclude that capitalist ownership structures and markets must be done away with. It is not enough to show that socialist economic institutions are morally superior to capitalist ones- they must also prove feasible.
In addressing the question of socialism’s feasibility, Cohen references and endorses the market socialist scheme of Marxist economist John Roemer, which is, conveniently, very similar to Matt’s own proposal. However, Cohen’s endorsement of this scheme comes with significant qualification. Cohen thinks that Roemer’s socialism is both feasible and resolves many of the problems with modern capitalism- however, as a market system, Roemer’s socialism is thus subject to many of the critiques which Cohen levies at capitalism.
In terms of the realization of socialist values, then, Cohen argues that we can and should go at least as far as a Roemer/Bruenig style market socialism. Whether we can go even further than that (as socialist values would ideally recommend), and if so how much further, are, for Cohen, open questions. Cohen writes:
But could we go further than Roemer in a nonmarket direction? I do not know whether the needed refinements are possible, nor do I know, speaking more generally, whether the full socialist ideal is feasible… we do not know how to honor personal choice, consistently with equality and community, on a large social scale. But I do not think that we now know that we will never know how to do these things: I am agnostic on that score.
Based on Cohen’s reflections, we might furnish Matt’s analysis by thinking of politics on the following 4 levels:
The abstract normative level.
The ideal institutions level- ie, the set of institutions which best cohere with one’s values all things considered.
The provisionally ideal institutions level- ie, the institutions which best cohere with one’s values, at least of all of the sets of institutions whose success one can “envision”.
The pragmatic level.
Of course, it will be hard to say much about the second level (which is, plausibly, why Matt didn’t include it in his article). After all, given our rudimentary understanding of the relevant domains, it would be nearly impossible to articulate what the optimal realization of one’s values in a complex society would look like with any degree of confidence.
We can however, apophatic style, identify certain features which our ideal social system would lack, given the assumption that a social system could plausibly function without said features. For instance, in Cohen’s case, a full realization of his values would require the dissolution of markets. This doesn’t necessarily mean that Cohen’s ideal social system would be market-less, but it does mean that there is a live possibility that market socialism does not end up being his “ideal” system- a possibility which hinges on the feasibility of non-market methods of distribution.
Thinking about possible ways in which one’s provisional utopia might fail to be one’s actual utopia, as Cohen does in Why Not Socialism, is, I think, of some analytic and political importance. Doing so provides us with guidance not only with respect to how we should adapt our political practice as our knowledge of the range of viable social forms expands, but also what kinds of institutions we should be trying to experiment with and explore given our current knowledge.
Similarly, contemplation of provisionally ideal institutions, even if these institutions are currently far out of reach, allows us to more suitably adjust our activities as political conditions change. Refusing to think about what institutions we’d most like to implement given our current knowledge results in both a lack of intellectual clarity as well as disoriented political practice. As Cohen puts it, “there are contexts where the ideal can be advanced, but is pushed forward less resolutely than it might be, because of a lack of clarity about what the ideal is.”
Now that I’ve articulated the basic layers according to which I think about politics, I will, like Matt, mention where I fall with respect to each of them. With respect to the abstract normative level, I am some sort of wide ranging value pluralist. This means that I think there are a variety of distinct and mutually irreducible values which should inform our political deliberation. Indeed, these values can even (and often do) come into conflict with one another, and must therefore be traded off against each other.
Given that ethics is, in my opinion, an incredibly messy and contextual affair, I could not possibly hope to exhaustively convey my ethical views in the course of a single article (or even a book, for that matter). One way of articulating my moral stance with regards to political and economic institutions, however, which strikes a reasonable balance between brevity and explanatory power, comes from the traditional socialist triad of equality, community, and freedom.
Here is a rough sketch of how I understand each of these values:
Equality: All else equal, people should enjoy equal access to advantage. Nobody should be left worse off than others in terms of resources, well being, etc. in virtue of factors that are outside of their control.
Community: All else equal, people should relate to one another in a communal spirit. People in society should generally care about and for one another, and cooperate with each other’s flourishing in mind.
Freedom: All else equal, people should not be subjected to arbitrary, far reaching control over their lives by others. Instead, people should be able to democratically self determine the conditions of their lives.
While these values can come into conflict in many contexts, I take it that they all recommend pushing society in the same general direction- namely, the direction of a bottom up, democratic socialist system. However, that is not a case that I will be attempting to make in this article.
On the provisionally ideal institutions level, I am more or less with Matt. While I do not have some detailed blueprint for a future socialist society, I can point to a variety of feasible socialist institutions- socially owned enterprises, general government services, social wealth funds, worker coops, unions, etc.- which I think, in some combination, could fully socialize the economy in a desirable and feasible manner.
With regards to my actually ideal institutions, I am in a similar boat as Cohen. I think that the kind of market socialism that Matt argues for is a preferable alternative to capitalism, and that we can and should go at least that far. However, there is still lots about this sort of market socialism that I find undesirable. I believe that a full realization of my values, if possible, would require the dissolution of markets and even the state (among other things). Whether these things can be achieved is an open question, but it’s one that I think leftist values demand we pursue and explore. What my actual ideal set of institutions would look like, then, is at present indeterminate.
Of course, answering the question of what policies I support in the immediate, pragmatic sense in any sort of exhaustive way would take far more space than I have for the remainder of this article. Moreover, on some level the answer to this question is constantly shifting along with the political context. That said, the general policies that I support fighting for in the near term are more or less in line with the typical leftist platform- higher taxes and more robust redistributive programs, better protections for unions, nationalization of certain industries, etc. For more specific and expansive discussion of the kinds of near term policy goals I support, I highly recommend checking out Matt Bruenig’s work at the Peoples Policy Project.